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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze Nash equilibria between electricity producers selling their production on an electricity
market and buying CO2 emission allowances on an auction carbon market. The producers’ strategies integrate the
coupling of the two markets via the cost functions of the electricity production. We set out a clear Nash equilibrium
on the power market that can be used to compute equilibrium prices on both markets as well as the related electricity
produced and CO2 emissions released.
AMS 2010 Subject Classifications 91A80, 91B26.
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to develop analytic tools in order to design a relevant mechanism for carbon markets, where
relevant refers to emissions reduction. For this purpose, we focus on electricity producers in a power market linked
to a carbon market. The link between markets is established through a market microstructure approach. In this
context, where the number of agents is limited, standard game theory applies. The producers are considered as players
behaving on the two financial markets represented here by carbon and electricity. We establish a Nash equilibrium for
this non-cooperative J-player game through a coupling mechanism between the two markets.
The original idea comes from the French electricity sector, where the spot electricity market is often used to satisfy
peak demand. Producers’ behavior is demand driven and linked to the maximum level of electricity production. Each
producer strives to maximize its market share. In the meantime, it has to manage the environmental burden associated
with its electricity production through a mechanism inspired by the EU ETS (European Emission Trading System)
framework: each producer unit of emissions must be counterbalanced by a permit or through the payment of a penalty.
Emission permit allocations are simulated through a carbon market that allows the producers to buy allowances at an
auction. Our focus on the electricity sector is motivated by its prevalence in the emission share (45% of the whole
emission level worldwide), and the introduction in phase III of the EU ETS of an auction-based allowance allocation
mechanism. In the present paper, the design assumptions made on the carbon market aim to foster emissions reduction
in the entire electricity sector.
Our approach proposes an original framework for the coupling of bidding strategies on two markets.
Given a static elastic demand curve on the electricity market (referring to the time stages in an organized electricity
market, mainly day-ahead and intra-day), we solve the local problem (just a single time period of the same length for
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both markets) of establishing a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium for the two coupled markets. This simplification is
justified here, as we aim to raise the condition under which a carbon market would be a real efficient instrument for
carbon mitigation policies.
This analysis is conducted for non-continuous and non-strictly monotone supply functions and bidding strategies
on both markets in the complete information framework.
While literature on applied game theory to strategic bidding on power markets mainly addresses profit maxi-
mization (see eg [5] with complete information, [6] with private information, [7] with incomplete information), our
objective function is share maximization.
The equilibria of the coupled markets are based on the full characterization of the equilibrium electricity price (on
the electricity market alone). We prove the uniqueness of the price and shares, for share maximization whereas, to our
knowledge this property is not established (under our hypotheses) for profit maximization (see eg [2]).
Moreover, share maximization approach deals with profit by making specific assumptions, i.e. no-loss sales, and
a tradeoff between the purchase of allowances and the carbon footprint of the electricity generated. Hence, this work
is the first attempt on power and carbon markets coupling through game theory approach. Other coupling approaches
use, for instance, models that produce dynamics for both electricity and carbon prices jointly, as in [3], [4].
In Section 2, we formalize the market (carbon and electricity) rules and the associated admissible set of players’
coupled strategies.
We start by studying (in section 3.1) the set of Nash equilibria on the electricity market alone (see Proposition 3.2).
This set constitutes an equivalence class (same prices and market shares) from which we exhibit a dominant strategy.
Section 3.2 is devoted to the analysis of coupled markets equilibria: given a specific carbon market design (in
terms of penalty level and allowances), we compute the bounds of the interval where carbon prices (derived from the
previous dominant strategy) evolve. We specify the properties of the associated equilibria.
2 Coupling markets mechanism
2.1 Electricity market
In the electricity market, demand is aggregated and summarized by a function p 7→ D(p), where D(p) is the quantity
of electricity that buyers are ready to obtain at maximal unit price p. We assume the following:
Assumption 2.1. The demand function D(·) : R+ → R+ is non-increasing, left continuous, and such that D(0) > 0.
(a) delivery 9-10 am (b) delivery 3-4 pm
Figure 1: The orange curve is the function q 7→ D−1(q) on the EPEX market. The evolution of the spot market
confirms the relevance of Assumption 2.1 on the Demand function p 7→ D(p).
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Each producer j ∈ {1, . . . , J} is characterized by a finite production capacity κj and a bounded and non-
decreasing function cj : [0, κj ] −→ R+ that associates a marginal production cost to any quantity q of electricity.
These marginal production costs depend on several exogenous parameters reflecting the technical costs associated
with electricity production e.g. energy prices, O&M costs, taxes, carbon penalties, etc. This parameter dependency
makes it possible to build different market coupling mechanisms. In the following we use it to link the carbon and
electricity markets.
The merit order ranking features marginal cost functions sorted according to their production costs. These are
therefore non-decreasing step functions whereby each step refers to the marginal production cost of a specific unit
owned by the producer.
The producers trade their electricity on a dedicated market. For a given producer j, the strategy consists of a
function that makes it possible to establish an asking price on the electricity market, defined as
sj :Cj × R+ −→ R+
(cj(·), q) −→ sj(cj(·), q),
where Cj the set of marginal production cost functions are explicitly given in the following (see (2.14)); sj(cj(·), q)
is the unit price at which the producer is ready to sell quantity q of electricity. An admissible strategy carries out the
following sell at no loss constraint
sj(cj(·), q) ≥ cj(q), ∀q ∈ Dom(cj). (2.1)
A possible example of such strategy is sj(cj(·), q) = cj(q) or sj(cj(·), q) = cj(q) + λ(q), where λ(q) stands for any
additional profit.
The constraint (2.1) guarantees profitable trade and incorporates an aspect of profit maximization (ie, loss avoid-
ance) into the market share approach. In what follows, we include this profit constraint in the considered class of
admissible strategies.
We define the class of admissible strategy profiles on electricity market S as:
S =
 s = (s1, . . . , sJ); sj : Cj × R
+ −→ R+
(cj(·), q) −→ sj(cj(·), q)
such that sj(cj(·), q) ≥ cj(q), ∀q ∈ Dom(cj)
 . (2.2)
As a function of q, sj(cj(·), q) is bounded on Dom(cj). For the sake of clarity, we define for each q 6∈ Dom(cj),
sj(cj(·), q) = plolc, where plolc is the loss of load cost, chosen as any overestimation of the maximal production costs.
For producer j’s strategy sj , we define the associated asking size at price p as
O(cj(·), sj ; p) := sup{q, sj(cj(·), q) < p} (2.3)
with sup ∅ = 0. HenceO(cj(·), sj ; p) is the maximum quantity of electricity at unit price p supplied by producer j on
the market. We also call p 7→ O(cj(·), sj ; p) the offer function of producer j.
Remark 2.2.
(i) The asking size function p 7→ O(cj(·), sj ; p) is, with respect to p, an non-decreasing surjection from [0,+∞) to
[0, κj ], right continuous and such that O(cj(·), sj ; 0) = 0. For a non-decreasing strategy sj , O(cj(·), sj ; .) is its
generalized inverse function with respect to q.
(ii) Given two strategies q 7→ sj(cj(·), q) and q 7→ s′j(cj(·), q) such that sj(cj(·), q) ≤ s′j(cj(·), q), for all q ∈
Dom(cj) we have for any positive p
O(cj(·), sj ; p) ≥ O(cj(·), s′j ; p).
Indeed, if p1 ≥ p2 then {q, sj(cj(·), q) ≤ p2} ⊂ {q, sj(cj(·), q) ≤ p1} from which we deduce that O(cj(·), sj ; ·) is
non-decreasing. Next, if sj(cj(·), ·) ≤ s′j(cj(·), ·), for any fixed p, we have {q, s′j(cj(·), q) ≤ p} ⊂ {q, sj(cj(·), q) ≤
p} from which the reverse order follows for the requests.
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We shall now describe the electricity market clearing. Note that from a market view point, the dependency of
the supply with respect to the marginal cost does not need to be explicit. For the sake of clarity, we write sj(q) and
O(sj ; p) instead of sj(cj(·), q) and O(cj(·), sj ; p). The dependency will be expressed explicitly whenever needed.
By aggregating the J asking size functions, we can define the overall asking function p 7→ O (s; p) a producer
strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sJ) as:
O (s; p) =
J∑
j=1
O(sj ; p). (2.4)
Hence, for any producer strategy profile s, O (s; p) is the quantity of electricity that can be sold on the market at unit
price p.
The overall supply function p 7→ O (s; p) is a non-decreasing surjection defined from [0,+∞) to [0,∑Jj=1 κj ],
such that O (s; 0) = 0.
2.1.1 Electricity market clearing
Taking producer strategy profile s = (s1(·), . . . , sJ(·)) the market sets the electricity market price pelec(s) together
with the quantities (ϕ1(s), . . . , ϕJ(s)) of electricity sold by each producer.
The market clearing price pelec(s) is the unit price paid to each producer for the quantities ϕj(s) of electricity.
The price p(s) may be defined as a price whereby supply satisfies demand. As we are working with a general non-
increasing demand curve (possibly locally inelastic), the price that satisfies the demand is not necessarily unique. We
thus define the clearing price generically with the following definition.
Definition 2.3 (The clearing electricity price). Let us define
p(s) = inf {p > 0; O (s; p) > D(p)}
and p¯(s) = sup {p ∈ [p(s), plolc];D(p) = D(p(s))}
(2.5)
with the convention that inf ∅ = plolc. The clearing price may then be established as any pelec(s) ∈ [p(s), p¯(s)] as an
output of a specific market clearing rule. To keep the price consistency, the market rule must be such that for any two
strategy profiles s and s′,
if p(s) < p(s′) then pelec(s) < pelec(s′),
if p(s) = p(s′) then pelec(s) = pelec(s′).
(2.6)
Note that p(s) 6= p¯(s) only if the demand curve p 7→ D(p) is constant on some intervals [p(s), p(s) + ]. In
that case, p(s) corresponds to the best ask price, while p¯(s) is the best bid price. The demand/offer curves that result
from the buyer/seller aggregation in a given time period implies some market fixing rules that allocate buyer surplus
and seller surplus. In that sense pelec(s) is a fixing price1. Note that pelec(s) = p(s) maximizes buyer surplus while
pelec(s) = p¯(s) maximizes seller surplus.
Note also that price p(s) is well defined in the case where demand does not strictly decrease. This includes the
case where demand is constant. In such case, p(s) = plolc only if the demand curve never crosses the supply.
Next, we define the quantity of electricity sold at price pelec(s). When pelec(s) is such that O (s; pelec(s)) ≤
D(pelec(s)), each producer sells O(sj ; pelec(s)), but cases where O (s; pelec(s)) > D(pelec(s)) may occur, requiring
the introduction of an auxiliary rule to share D(pelec(s)) among the producers that propose O (s; pelec(s)). Note that
in this last case, due to the clearing property (2.6) on pelec(·), we have O (s; p(s)) > D(pelec(s)) = D(p(s)). Hence
the D(pelec(s)) is totally provided by producers with non null offer at price p(s). The rule of the market is to share
D(pelec(s)) among these producers only. This gives an explicit priority to the best offer prices p(s).
Let us break down supply as follows:
O (s; p(s)) =
J∑
j=1
O(sj ; p(s)−) +
J∑
j=1
∆−O(sj ; p(s)),
1One can imagine that Power market participants have access to the detailed fixing rules, but information proves hard to be found.
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Figure 2: Electricity price p(s) and p¯(s).
where ∆−O(sj ; p(s)) := O(sj ; p(s))−O(sj ; p(s)−) and f(x−) denotes the left value at x of a function f .
The market’s choice is to fully accept the asking size of producers with continuous asking size curve at point
p(s). For producers with discontinuous asking size curve at p(s), a market rule based on proportionality that fa-
vors abundance is used to share the remaining part of the supply: any extra supply available at the clearing price
O (s; p(s)) −D(p(s)) is split among all generators offering at that price such that they each get the same percentage
of their offered quantity allocated to production.
We summarize the market rule on quantities as follows.
Definition 2.4 (Clearing electricity quantities). The quantity ϕj(s) of electricity sold by Producer j on the electricity
market is
ϕj(s) =

O(sj ; pelec(s))= O(sj ; p(s)), if D(pelec(s)) ≥ O (s; pelec(s)),
O(sj ; p(s)−) + ∆−O(sj ; p(s))D(p(s))−O (s; p(s)
−)
∆−O (s; p(s)) ,
if D(p(s)) < O (s; p(s)),
(2.7)
where ∆−O (s; p(s)) :=
J∑
j=1
∆−O(sj ; p(s)) > 0.
Note that, when D(p(s)) < O (s; p(s)), we have ∆−O (s; p(s)) > 0. Note also that
J∑
i=1
ϕj(s) = D(p
elec(s)) ∧ O (s; pelec(s)) = D(p(s)) ∧ O (s; p(s)), (2.8)
and for all j, O(sj ; p(s)−) ≤ ϕj(s) ≤ O(sj ; p(s)). (2.9)
2.2 Carbon market
Let us recall the CO2 regulation principle on which we base our analysis. Producers are penalized according to their
emission level if they do not own allowances. Hence, in parallel to their position on the electricity market, producers
buy CO2 emission allowances on a separate CO2 auction market. In the following, we formalize producer strategy on
the CO2 market only.
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If they are allowed to, producers buying permits on the CO2 market will use them either to cap their own power
production emissions, either to prevent other players from buying permits. The following assumption introduces some
market design rules that control players behavior on that market.
Assumption 2.5 (Capped carbon market).
(i) The carbon market is capped and has a finite known quantity Ω of CO2 emission allowances available.
(ii) Each producer j can buy a capped number of allowances Ej , related to its own CO2 emission capacity.
(iii) Emissions that are not covered by allowances are penalized at a unit rate p.
Note that if one chose Ej ≥ Ω for all producers then item (ii) is void. Other choice for the Ej can be seen as
strengthen regulation tool.
On this market, producers adopt a strategy that consists of an offer function τ 7→ Aj(τ) defined from [0, p] to
[0, Ej ]. Quantity Aj(τ) is the quantity of allowances that producer j is ready to buy at price τ . This offer may not be
a monotonic function. We denote A the strategy profile set on the CO2 market,
A := {A = (A1, . . . , AJ); s.t. Aj : [0, p]→ [0, Ej ]}.
The CO2 market reacts by aggregating the J offers by
A (τ) :=
J∑
j=1
Aj(τ),
and the clearing market price is established following a second item auction2 as:
pCO2(A) := sup{τ ;A (τ) > Ω}, with the convention sup ∅ = 0. (2.10)
Note that pCO2(A) = 0 indicates that there are too many allowances to sell. It is worth a reminder here that the
aim of allowances is to decrease emissions. In section 3.2, we discuss a design hypothesis (Assumption 3.8) that
guarantees an equilibrium price pCO2(A) > 0. Therefore, in the following, we assume that the overall quantity Ω of
allowances, is such that pCO2(A) > 0.
Next, we define the amount of allowances bought at price pCO2(A) by the producers. By Definition (2.10), we
have A (pCO2(A)) ≥ Ω and A (pCO2(A)+) ≤ Ω. When A (pCO2(A)) > Ω, the CO2 market must decide between the
producers with an additional rule. We define
∆(Ai) := Ai(p
CO2(A)+)−Ai(pCO2(A)).
For a producer i, ∆(Ai) ≥ 0 means that its CO2 demand does not decrease if the price increases. It is therefore
ready to pay more to obtain the quantity of allowances it is asking for at price pCO2(A). The CO2 market gives
priority to this kind of producer, which will be fully served. The producers such that ∆(Aj) < 0 share the remaining
allowances. This can be written as follows.
Each producers with Aj(pCO2(A)) > 0 obtains the following quantity δj(A) of allowances
δj(A) :=

Aj(p
CO2(A)), if ∆(Aj) ≥ 0,
Aj(p
CO2(A)+) +
(−∆(Aj))+
J∑
i=1
(−∆(Ai))+
(
Ω−
J∑
i=1
Ai(p
CO2(A))1{∆(Ai)≥0}
)
,
otherwise.
(2.11)
2 Also called Dutch auction market with several units to sell, in a second item auction market, the seller begins with a very high price and
reduces it. The price is lowered until a bidder accepts the current price.
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2.3 Carbon and electricity market coupling
In the following, we formalize the coordination of a producer’s strategy on the CO2 and electricity markets. This could
be seen as if both markets were synchronized during a single time period with the same length (eg, one hour).
As mentioned earlier, for each producer, the marginal cost function is parametrized by the positions A of the
producers on the carbon market. Indeed, producer j can obtain CO2 emission allowances on the market to avoid
penalization for (some of) its emissions. Those emissions that are not covered by allowances are penalized at a unit
rate p.
A profile of an offer to buy from the producers A = (A1, . . . , AJ), through the CO2 market clearing, corresponds
to a unit price of pCO2(A) of the allowance and quantities δj(A) of allowances bought by each producer (defined by
the market rules (2.10),(2.11)).
This yields to the following modified marginal production cost function3 cAj (·), parametrized by the emission
regulations:
q 7→ cAj (q) =
{
cj(q) + ej(q)p
CO2(A), for q ∈ [0, κCO2j (A) ∧ κj ]
cj(q) + ej(q)p, for q ∈ [κCO2j (A) ∧ κj , κj ]
(2.12)
where for all producers {j = 1, . . . , J},
• q 7→ ej(q) is the emission rate (originally in CO2 t/Mwh),
• κCO2j (A) is the electricity capacity covered by the bought allowances δj(A) ≤ Ej :
κCO2j (A) = argmax{k;
∫ k
0
ej(z)dz ≤ δj(A)}.
In this coupled market setting, the strategy of producer j thus makes a pair (Aj , sj). The set of admissible strategy
profile is defined as
Σ= {(A, s); A ∈ A, s ∈ S} , (2.13)
where in the definition of S in (2.2), we use
Cj =
{
cAj ; A ∈ A
}
. (2.14)
Prices for allowances and electricity, pCO2((A, s)) and pelec((A, s)), quantities of allowances bought by each producer,
δj((A, s)) and market shares on electricity market ϕj((A, s)) of each producer corresponds to any strategy profile
(A, s) ∈ Σ, through the market mechanisms described.
3 Nash Equilibrium analysis
We suppose that the J producers behave non-cooperatively, aiming at maximizing their individual market share on
the electricity market. For a strategy profile (A, s) ∈ Σ, the market share of a producer j depends upon its strategy
(Aj , sj(·)) but also on the strategies (A−j , s−j) of the other producers4. In this set-up the natural solution is the Nash
equilibrium (see e.g. [1]). More precisely we are looking for a strategy profile
(A∗, s∗) = ((A∗1, s
∗
1), · · · , (A∗J , s∗J)) ∈ Σ
that satisfies Nash equilibrium conditions: none of the producers would strictly benefit, that is, would strictly increase
its market share from a unilateral deviation. Namely, for any producer j strategy (Aj , sj) such that ((A∗−j , s
∗
−j), (Aj , sj)) ∈
Σ, we have
ϕj((A
∗, s∗)) ≥ ϕj((A∗−j , s∗−j), (Aj , sj)), (3.1)
3Note that this representation might also include the allowances possibly stored by the producers in the previous periods.
4Here we use the generic notation b−j that stands for the profile set (b1, · · · , bj−1, bj+1, · · · , bJ ).
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where ϕj is the quantity of electricity sold. Note that the dependency in terms of A through the marginal cost cAj is
now made explicit in ϕj .
Condition (3.1) has to be satisfied for any unilateral deviation of any producer j. In particular (3.1) has to be
satisfied for a producer j admissible deviation (A∗j , sj) such that ((A
∗
−j , s
∗
−j), (A
∗
j , sj)) ∈ Σwhere producer j would
only change its behavior on the electricity market.
Remark 3.1.
The electricity strategy component s∗ of the Nash equilibrium (A∗, s∗) is also a Nash equilibrium for the restricted
electricity game, where producers only behave on the electricity market with marginal electricity production costs
cA
∗
j (·), j = 1, · · · J .
The next section focuses on determining a Nash equilibrium on the game restricted to the electricity market.
3.1 Equilibrium on the power market
In this restricted set-up, we consider that the marginal costs {cj , j = 1 . . . , J} are known data, possibly fixed through
the position A on the CO2 market. In this section, we refer to S as the set of admissible strategy profiles, in the
particular case where Cj = {cj} for each j = 1, . . . , J .
The Nash equilibrium problem is as follows: find s∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s
∗
J) ∈ S such that
∀j,∀ sj 6= s∗j , ϕj(s∗) ≥ ϕj(s∗−j , sj). (3.2)
The following proposition exhibits a Nash equilibrium, whereby each producer must choose the strategy denoted
by Cj , and referred to as marginal production cost strategy. It is defined by
Cj(q) =
{
cj(q), for q ∈ Dom(cj)
plolc, for q 6∈ Dom(cj). (3.3)
Proposition 3.2.
(i) For any strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sJ), no producer j ∈ {1, . . . , J} can be penalized by deviating from strategy
sj to its marginal production cost strategy Cj , namely,
ϕj(s) ≤ ϕj(s−j , Cj). (3.4)
In other words, for any producer j, Cj is a dominant strategy.
(ii) The strategy profile C = (C1, . . . CJ) is a Nash equilibrium.
(iii) If the strategy profile s ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium, then we have p¯(s) = p¯(C), and for any producer j, ϕj(s) =
ϕj(C).
Point (ii) exhibits a Nash equilibrium strategy profile as a direct consequence of the dominance property (i). Clearly
the Nash equilibrium is non-unique, since we can easily show that a producer’s given supply can follow from countless
different strategies. Nevertheless point (iii) shows that there is a unique associated quantities of electricity sold by
producers. The market coupling mechanism that we propose in the following section is based on this uniqueness
property which allows the computation of the equilibrium shares on electricity and carbon markets. Moreover, any
Nash equilibrium price evolves in the interval pelec(s) ∈ [p(C), p¯(C)], which reduces to the point {p¯(C)} in various
situations, in particular when D(·) strictly decreases at p(C), or when pelec is chosen equal to p¯.
Proofs of (i) and (iii), which are rather tedious due to non-strictly monotony and possible discontinuity of supply
and offers, are postponed to Appendix A.1.
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3.2 Coupled market design using the Nash equilibrium
From this point we restrict our attention to a particular market design. In the following, the scope of the analysis
applies to a special class of producers, a specific electricity market price clearing (satisfying Definition 2.3) and a
range of quantities Ω of allowances available on the CO2 market. Although not necessary, the following restriction
simplifies the development.
Assumption 3.3. On the producers. Each producer j operates a single production unit, for which
(i) the initial marginal cost contribution (that does not depend on the producer positions A in the CO2 market) is
constant, q 7→ cj(q) = cj . The related emission rate q 7→ ej(q) = ej is also assumed to be a positive constant,
(ii) the producers are different pairwise: ∀i, j ∈ {1, · · · J}, (ci, ei) 6= (cj , ej).
In what follows (according to Assumption 2.5), in order to limit the number of parameters involved in the discus-
sion, the maximal cap of allowances that each producer j may buy is set to Ej = ejκj . This arbitrary but natural choice
does not penalize producers capacity level, and does not bring any restriction to the following equilibrium analysis.
As a consequence of Assumption 3.3, the marginal production cost in (2.12) can simply be written as
q 7→ cAj (q) =

cj + ejp
CO2(A), for q ∈ [0, δj(A)
ej
∧ κj ]
cj + ejp, for q ∈ [δj(A)
ej
∧ κj , κj ].
(3.5)
For a given strategy profile on the electricity market, Definition 2.3 gives a range of possible determinations for the
electricity price. Previously, the analysis of the Nash Equilibrium restricted to the electricity market did not require a
precise clearing price determination. Nevertheless to extend our analysis to the coupling we need to make explicit this
determination and assume the following:
Assumption 3.4. On the electricity market. For a given strategy profile s of the producers, the clearing price of
electricity is pelec(s). The market rule fixes pelec(·) = p¯(·) or pelec(·) = p(·) as defined in (2.5).
We will illustrate below that this choice of clearing price ensures the increasing behavior of pelec(·) and right
continuity in terms of the carbon price (see Lemma 3.6).
The quantity Ω of CO2 allowances available plays a crucial role in the market design. If this quantity is too
high, the allowance’s market price will drop to zero, leaving the market incapable of fulfilling its role of decreasing
CO2 emissions. Therefore we clearly need to make an assumption that restricts the number of allowances available.
Appropriately capping the maximum quantity of allowances available requires information on which producers are
willing to obtain allowances. This is the objective of the following paragraph where we define a willing to buy function
that plays a central role in the analysis of Nash equilibria.
3.2.1 Willing to buy functions
In this paragraph, we aim at guessing a Nash equilibrium candidate. We base our reasoning on the dominant strategies
on the electricity market alone (see Proposition 3.2). Remark 3.1 allows us to fix the electricity market strategy as a
marginal production cost strategy, given the marginal cost functions CA = {cAj , j = 1, . . . J} imposed by the output
of the CO2 clearing, as in (3.5).
In particular, when A ∈ A, we observe that the strategies (A, {cAj , j = 1, . . . J}) are in the set of admissible
strategies defined in (2.13).
From now on, all the strategy profiles that we consider on the carbon market are assumed to be admissible.
In the following, as the discussion will mainly focus on the impact of strategies A through the carbon market, we
denote the electricity market output as:
pelec(A) instead of pelec(CA)
(ϕ1(A), . . . , ϕJ(A)) instead of (ϕ1(CA), . . . , ϕJ(CA)).
(3.6)
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To begin with, we consider an exogenous CO2 cost τ similar to a CO2 tax rate: the producers’ marginal cost
becomes for any τ ∈ [0, p], cτj (·),
cτj (q) = cj + τej , for q ∈ [0, κj ], j = 1, . . . , J.
In this tax framework, the dominant strategy on the electricity market is also parametrized by τ as Cτ = {cτj , j =
1, . . . J} defined in (3.3). The clearing electricity price and quantities follow as
pelec(τ) = pelec(Cτ ),
(ϕ1(τ), . . . , ϕJ(τ)) = (ϕ1(C
τ ), . . . , ϕJ(C
τ )).
(3.7)
Price pelec(τ) will be referred to as the taxed electricity price, by contrast with price pelec(A) issued from the marginal
production cost strategy that results from the position A on the carbon market.
Remark 3.5. Considering a carbon tax τ and a carbon market strategy A such that τ = pCO2(A), we emphasize the
fact that the corresponding electricity prices are not equivalent, but we always have the following inequality
pelec(τ) ≤ pelec(A).
This follows from the fact that for all i, cτi (·) ≤ cAi (·) and hence O(cAi ; ·) ≤ O(cτi ; ·). The gap between Cτ (·) and
CA(·) comes both from the width (Ω effect) and the height (penalty effect) of their steps.
We start with the following:
Lemma 3.6. Under Assumption 3.4, the map τ 7→ pelec(τ) is non-decreasing and right continuous.
We determine the willing-to-buy-allowances functionsWj(·) andW(·), as follows:
Wj(τ) = ejϕj(τ) and W(τ) =
J∑
j=1
Wj(τ). (3.8)
For producer j, Wj is the quantity of emissions it would produce under the penalization τ , and consequently the
quantity of allowances it would be ready to buy at price τ . Given the CO2 value τ , the total amountW(τ) represents
the allowances needed to cover the global emissions generated by the players who have won electricity market shares.
We also define the functions
Wj(τ) = ejκj1{ϕj(τ)>0}, and W(τ) =
J∑
j=1
Wj(τ). (3.9)
Given that the CO2 value τ , W(τ) is the amount of allowances needed by the producers who have won electricity
market shares and want to cover their overall production capacity κj . Obviously we have
W(τ) ≤ W(τ), ∀τ ∈ [0, p].
Moreover,
Lemma 3.7. The function τ 7→ W(τ) is non-increasing:
W(t′) ≤ W(t), ∀ 0 ≤ t < t′ ≤ p.
The proofs of both Lemma 3.6 and Lemma 3.7 can be found in Appendix A.2.
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3.2.2 Towards an equilibrium strategy
The main result of the section is the computation of the bounds of the interval in which the coupled carbon market Nash
equilibria prices evolve: we demonstrate that there is no possible deviation enabling a Nash equilibrium carbon price
outside this interval. The price bounds are elaborated as specific carbon prices associated to two explicit strategies,
build from the willing-to-buy-allowances functions: the Lower price strategy, and the Higher price strategy.
In order to characterize further Nash equilibria candidates, evolving in this price interval, we analyze a third set of
strategies that are intermediate strategies.
Those strategies rely on our last design assumption which prevents the carbon market from market failure:
W(0) ≤ Ω : no auction, W(p) ≥ Ω : allowances shortage.
Assumption 3.8. On the carbon market design. The available allowances Ω satisfy
W(p) < Ω <W(0).
Moreover, p is chosen such that no producer is sidelined from the game: for all j, τ 7→ Wj(τ) is not identically zero
on [0, p].
Assumption 3.8 allows to define two prices of particular interest for the game analysis:
τ lower = sup{τ ∈ [0, p] s.t.W(τ) > Ω}, (3.10)
and τ higher = sup{τ ∈ [0, p] s.t.W(τ) > Ω}. (3.11)
Observe that we always have τ lower ≤ τ higher.
Lower price through lower price strategy
Lemma 3.9. Consider any strategy AW = (AW1 , . . . , AWJ ) such that
AWj (τ) =
{ Wj(τ lower), for 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ lower,
anything admissible, for τ > τ lower.
(3.12)
(i) pCO2(AW) ≥ τ lower.
(ii) In the case where pCO2(AW) = τ lower, there is no unilateral favorable deviation that clears the market at a CO2
price lower than τ lower.
We call the Lower price strategy (W1, . . . ,WJ), as pCO2((W1, . . . ,WJ)) = τ lower by price definitions (2.10) and
(3.10).
Proof. Point (i) is a consequence of the definition of τ lower = sup{τ ∈ [0, p], s.t. W(τ) > Ω}. Since AWj (τ) =
Wj(τ) for τ ≤ τ lower, it follows that pCO2(AW) = sup{τ ∈ [0, p], s.t.
∑
j A
W
j (τ) > Ω} ≥ τ lower.
To prove (ii), first note that, since we assume pCO2(AW) = τ lower, we have ϕj(AW) ≤ ϕj(τ lower) = 1ejWj(τ lower).
Indeed, the carbon market clearing can decrease the global function O (Cτ lower ; ·) to O (AW ; ·), but the demand func-
tion stay unchanged. So, we still have ϕj(AW) = 1ej δj(A
W).
Suppose one producer, say Producer 1, deviates and chooses A˜1(·) instead of AW1 (·). Suppose the new carbon
price τ˜ := pCO2(AW−1, A˜1) < τ
lower. Since AWj (τ˜
+) = AWj (τ˜) for j 6= 1, necessarily we have A˜1(τ˜+) ≤ A˜1(τ˜), by
definition of τ˜ . Then ∆(A˜1) ≥ 0 and it follows that δ1(AW−1, A˜1) ≤ δ1(AW), but δj(AW−1, A˜1) ≥ δj(AW) for the
others j 6= 1.
If pelec(AW−1, A˜1) ≥ pelec(AW), the others j 6= 1 produce at least electricity for the allowances they have,
ϕj(A
W
−1, A˜1) ≥ ϕj(AW). Since the demand is decreasing we have ϕ1(AW−1, A˜1) ≤ ϕ1(AW).
Now, if pelec(AW−1, A˜1) < p
elec(AW), the offer of Producer 1 based on his penalized marginal production cost is
also greater than pelec(AW−1, A˜1). Then ϕ1(A
W
−1, A˜1) ≤ 1e1 δ1(AW−1, A˜1) ≤ ϕ1(AW).
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Lemma 3.10. Suppose A is such that pCO2(A) < τ lower. Then A is not a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. To prove this lemma we exhibit an unilateral favorable deviation of a producer.
a) Assume first that at least one producer exists, say Producer 1, such that ϕ1(A) < κ1 and there exists a tax value
τˆ1 such that pCO2(A) < τˆ1 ≤ τ lower and,W1(τ) = e1κ1 for any τ ∈ [pCO2(A), τˆ1].
This means that Producer 1 may sell κ1, for any tax level τ in [pCO2(A), τˆ1], and consequently we have c1 + τe1 <
pelec(τ) for τ in [pCO2(A), τˆ1].
Consider a deviation A˜1 of player 1, such that the resulting clearing price on CO2 market, pCO2(A−1, A˜1) ∈
[pCO2(A), τˆ1].
From Remark 3.5, we have
C1 + τe1 ≤ pelec(pCO2(A−1, A˜1)) ≤ pelec(A−1, A˜1).
This means that Producer 1 may sell its overall covered capacity: ϕ1(A−1, A˜1) = 1e1 δ1(A−1, A˜1).
Now we define τ 7→ A˜1(τ) as follows, for ε > 0 arbitrarily small and pCO2(A) ≤ τ ,
A˜1(p
CO2(A)) = e1κ1,
A˜1(τ) =
(
Ω−∑j>1Aj(τ)− ε)1{∑
j 6=1
Aj(τ) + δ1(A) ≥ Ω}
+e1κ11{
∑
j 6=1
Aj(τ) + δ1(A) < Ω} for τ ∈ (p
CO2(A), τˆ1]
= A1(τ), for τ > τˆ1.
Note that A˜1(τ) ≥ A1(τ) for pCO2(A) ≤ τ ≤ τˆ1, and consequently pCO2(A−1, A˜1) ≥ pCO2(A).
If pCO2(A−1, A˜1) > pCO2(A), then e1ϕ1(A−1, A˜1)) = δ(A−1, A˜1) > δ(A) ≥ e1ϕ1(A), and we get our favorable
deviation.
If pCO2(A−1, A˜1) = pCO2(A), we observe that when ∆(A1) ≥ 0, we also have ∆(A˜1) = 0. Then by the CO2
market clearing mechanism, Producer 1 gets e1κ1 allowances instead of δ(A) and strictly improves its electricity
market share. when ∆(A1) < 0, we have A˜1(pCO2(A)+) > A1(pCO2(A)+), that also insures that Producer 1 increases
δ(A−1, A˜1) > δ(A) (see (2.11)).
b) Assume now that all producers are either such that ϕj(A) = κj or such that ϕj(A) < κj andWj(pCO2(A)+) <
ejκj . Among the second category, there exists at least one producer (say Producer 1) such that ϕ1(A) < ϕ1(pCO2(A))
with ϕ1(pCO2(A)) > 0 (unless to contradict pCO2(A) < τ lower). Here we have used the notation (3.6) and (3.7).
W1(pCO2(A)+) < e1κ1 means that c1 + e1pCO2(A) = pelec(pCO2(A)) (as pelec(·) is right-continuous).
A strictly favorable deviation A˜1 of Producer 1, thus consists in increasing its ask at the price pCO2(A)+, in order
to increase its δ(A−1, A˜1) (see (2.11)):
A˜1(τ) =
Ω−∑
j>1
Aj(τ)− ε
1{pCO2(A) < τ} + e1κ11{pCO2(A) = τ}.
Then pCO2(A−1, A˜1) = pCO2(A), A˜1(pCO2(A)) ≥ A1(pCO2(A)), but A˜1(pCO2(A)+) > A1(pCO2(A)+), for ε suffi-
ciently small. This last inequality guarantees that δ1(A−1, A˜1) > δ1(A) and finally ϕ1(pCO2(A)) ≥ ϕ1(A−1, A˜1) >
ϕ1(A).
Higher price through higher price strategy
Lemma 3.11. Consider any strategy AW = (AW1 , · · · , AWJ ) such that
AWj (τ) =
{
anything admissible, for τ ≤ τ higher,
Wj(τ), for τ > τ higher. (3.13)
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(i) pCO2(AW) ≤ τ higher.
(ii) There is no unilateral favorable deviation that clears the market at a CO2 price higher than τ higher.
We call the Higher price strategy (W1, . . . ,WJ), as pCO2((W1, . . . ,WJ)) = τ higher by price definitions (2.10) and
(3.11).
Proof. Point (i) follows directly from the definition of τ higher.
To prove (ii), suppose one producer, say Producer 1, chooses its strategy A˜1(·) instead of AW1 (·), and that the
resulting CO2 price is τ˜ := pCO2(AW−1, A˜1) > τ
higher. Necessarily, due to the definition of AW , this means that
W1(τ˜) = 0, which in turn means that c1 + τ˜ e1 > pelec(τ˜). To conclude, it is sufficient to notice that any Producer
j 6= 1 obtains what he asks for, i.e. δj(AW−1, A˜1) = Wj(τ˜+), from which it follows that the coupled electricity price
equals the taxed electricity price: pelec(AW−1, A˜1) = p
elec(τ˜), and then ϕ1(AW−1, A˜1) =Wi(τ˜) = 0 and the deviation
of 1 is not favorable.
A strategy A is said to be effective if all the producers that bought some allowances produce some electricity:
∀j, δj(A) > 0⇒ ϕj(pCO2(A)) > 0.
Lemma 3.12.
(i) Let A admissible such that pCO2(A) > τ higher. Then A is not an effective strategy.
(ii) Let A admissible such that pCO2(A) > τ higher. Then A is not a strong Nash equilibrium.
As a consequence of this lemma, if a producer (or a set of producers) that does not produce electricity, tries to
block the auction game of the carbon market by buying all the allowances he can, then there always exists a coalition
with favorable deviation.
Proof. (i). Effective means that for all producers such that δj(A) > 0, we have Wj(pCO2(A)) = ejκj , which is
clearly in contradiction with the definition of τ higher.
(ii). Given A, such that pCO2(A) > τ higher, we consider the coalition of producers K such that for j ∈ K,
Wj(pCO2(A)) = 0. K is clearly non-empty by definition of τ higher. Consider the following cooperating deviation of
K:
A˜j(·) = AWj (·), for j ∈ K.
Then pCO2(A−K, A˜K) < pCO2(A), and at least for one member of the coalitionK, δj(A−K, A˜K) > 0 whenWj(pCO2(A−K, A˜K)) >
0. This means that ϕj(A−K, A˜K) > 0 which is a strictly favorable deviation of j, whereas the situation is unchanged
for the others in K that still produce nothing. Thus, we exhibit a coalition that allows a deviation from A that benefits
to all of its members, and that benefits strictly to at least one. Then A is not a strong Nash equilibrium.
Price interval
From Lemmas 3.10 and 3.12, we have the following:
Corollary 3.13. IfA is a strong Nash equilibrium, or if it is an effective Nash equilibrium, then pCO2(A) ∈ [τ lower, τ higher].
The interval in which the coupled carbon market Nash equilibria prices evolve is then [τ lower, τ higher]. This price
range is generated by the existing gap between the functionsW(·) andW(·).
Thus a condition for a single unique carbon price is that this gap shrinks to zero: the equality between the two
willing-to-buy-allowances functionals occurs i.e. for any value τ , and any producer i, the allowances needed to cover
the global emissions generated by a player who has won electricity market shares and the allowances needed by
a producer who has won electricity market shares and wants to cover its overall production capacity are the same.
Clearly, this is very unlikely to happen.
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It is worth of mentioning that the same lemmas apply when producers have an electricity production power plants
portfolio, or when one modifies the maximal cap Ej of allowances that each producer j may buy while one redefines
τ 7→ Wj(τ) by
Wj(τ) = Ej1{ϕj(τ)>0}.
Note that if one increases the maximal cap, τ higher increases.
Intermediate strategies
Consider any strategy profile B = (B1, · · · , BJ) satisfying the following:
Bj(τ) =
 Wj(τ
lower), for τ ≤ τ lower,
anything admissible, for τ lower < τ ≤ τ higher,
Wj(τ), for τ > τ higher.
(3.14)
This is not in general an equilibrium, nevertheless we have the following properties:
Lemma 3.14.
(i) pCO2(B) ∈ [τ lower, τ higher].
(ii) If there exists a favorable deviation from a producer, say Producer 1, that chooses B˜1 instead of B1, such that
pCO2(B−1, B˜1) < τ lower, then there exists another favorable deviation B̂1 defined by
B̂1 =
{
B˜1(τ), for τ > τ lower,
W1(τ lower), for τ ≤ τ lower
such that pCO2(B−1; B̂1) = τ lower, and such that ϕ1(B−1, B̂1) ≥ ϕ1(B−1, B˜1).
Proof. Point (i) follows directly from Lemma 3.9-(i) and Lemma 3.11-(i).
To prove (ii), we first observe that, as producers j 6= 1 are served first on the carbon market,
δ1(B−1; B˜1) = Ω−
∑
j 6=1
Wj(τ lower).
Moreover, we have pCO2(B−1, B̂1) = τ lower, and from the CO2 market mechanism it follows that
δ1(B−1, B̂1) ≥ δ1(B−1, B˜1).
Since B˜j(pCO2(B−1, B˜1)) = B˜j(pCO2(B−1, B˜1)+) = Wj(τ lower) for any j 6= 1, it follows that δ1(B−1, B˜1) = Ω −∑
j 6=1Wj(τ lower). Indeed, for strategy (B−1, B̂1), the producers j 6= 1 such that Bj(τ lower
+
) < Wj(τ lower) receive
a quantity of quotas δj(B−1, B̂1) ≤ Wj(τ lower), from which δ1(B−1, B̂1) = Ω −
∑
j δj(B−1, B̂1) ≥ δ1(B−1, B̂1).
We also deduce that ϕ1(B−1, B̂1) = 1e1 δ1(B−1, B̂1). To conclude, it is sufficient to notice that ϕ1(B−1, B̂1) =
1
e1
δ1(B−1, B̂1) ≥ 1e1 δ1(B−1, B˜1) ≥ ϕ1(B−1, B˜1).
The following aims to characterize the form of effective Nash equilibria.
Corollary 3.15. Let E be an effective Nash equilibrium (i.e pCO2(E) ≤ τ higher). Then the following E′ is also an
effective Nash equilibrium:
E′j(τ) =

Wj(τ lower), for τ ≤ τ lower,
Ej(τ), for τ lower < τ ≤ τ higher,
Wj(τ), for τ > τ higher.
(3.15)
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Proof. From Lemmas 3.9 and 3.11, pCO2(E) ∈ [τ lower, τ higher]. Consider a deviation that produces a bigger carbon
price: Producer 1 deviates fromE′1 to E˜′1 with p
CO2(E˜′1,E
′−1) > τ higher. Then by definition of τ higher, ϕ1(E˜′1,E
′−1) =
0. Indeed, a deviation to this bigger price is possible only ifW1(pCO2((E˜′1,E′−1)) = 0.
Now if Producer 1 deviates from E′1 to E˜′1 with p
CO2((E˜′1,E
′−1)) < τ lower, and if we assume that this devi-
ation is strictly favorable: ϕ1(E˜′1,E
′−1) > ϕ1(E′). Then according to Lemma 3.14, we consider Eˆ′1 that gives
pCO2(Eˆ1,E
′−1) = τ lower. And we still have that ϕ1(Eˆ′1,E
′−1) > ϕ1(E′). But the deviation (Eˆ′1,E−1) from E pro-
duces the same price and shares than (Eˆ′1,E
′−1)). Since we also have ϕ1(E′) = ϕ1(E), we get a strictly favorable
deviation to E which gives the contradiction.
Same arguments apply when Producer 1 deviates from E′1 to E˜′1 with p
CO2(E˜′1) in [τ
lower, τ higher].
4 Conclusion
Once CO2 is emitted into the atmosphere, it remains there for more than a century. Estimating its value is an essential
indicator for efficiently defining policy. Carbon valuation is crucial for designing markets that foster emission reduc-
tions. In this paper, we established the links between an electricity market and a carbon auction market through an
analysis of electricity producers’ strategies. We proved that they lead to the interval where relevant Nash equilibria
evolve, enabling the computation of equilibrium prices on both markets. For each producer, each equilibrium derives
the level of electricity produced and the CO2 emissions covered.
For a given design and set of players, the information provided by the interval may be interpreted as a diagnosis
of market behavior in terms of prices and volume. Indeed, it enables the computation of the CO2 emissions actually
released, and opens the discussion of a relevant carbon market in terms of mitigation issues.
In addition to this analysis of the Nash equilibrium we plan to analyze the electricity production mix, with a
particular focus on renewable shares that do not participate in emissions.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.2
A. First we prove the dominance property (i).
Suppose that one producer, let us say producer 1, deviates and chooses C1 instead of s1. We have to show that its
market share cannot be reduced by this deviation. By definition of the admissibility (see (2.2)) we have
s1(q) ≥ C1(q),∀q ∈ [0, κ1].
Hence the offer functions defined by (2.3) satisfy O(s1; ·) ≤ O(C1; ·). By adding the unchanged offers of the other
producers
O ((s−1, s1); ·) ≤ O ((s−1, C1); ·), (A.1)
where (s−1, C1) denotes the strategy profile that includes Producer 1 deviation. The minimum market clearing price
(2.5) for strategy profile s is
p(s) = inf{p, O (s; p) > D(p)}.
The minimum market clearing price (2.5) for strategy profile (s−1, C1) is
p(s−1, C1) = inf{p, O ((s−1, C1); p) > D(p)}.
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The inequality (A.1) together with the fact that the demand D(·) is a non-increasing function imply that p(s−1, C1) ≤
p(s), from which, with (2.6) we deduce that
pelec(s−1, C1) ≤ pelec(s).
Now let us show that Producer 1 does not reduce its market share by deviating from s1(·) to C1(·), that is
ϕ1(s−1, C1) ≥ ϕ1(s).
For the sake of clarity we adopt, in this paragraph, the following notation:
ps := p(s)
pelecs := p
elec(s)
and
psC := p(s−1, C1)
pelecsC := p
elec((s−1, C1)).
We first consider the case where psC < ps. By definition of the minimum clearing price psC , the fact that
D(ps) ≤ D(psC) and the fact that O ((s−1, C1); ·) is non-decreasing, we have
D(pelecs ) ≤ D(ps) ≤ D(psC) ≤ O ((s−1, C1); psC) ≤ O ((s−1, C1); pelecsC ).
Hence,
O ((s−1, s1), pelecs ) ∧D(pelecs ) ≤ O ((s−1, C1); pelecsC ) ∧D(pelecsC ),
O ((s−1, s1), ps) ∧D(ps) ≤ O ((s−1, C1); psC) ∧D(psC).
From the market clearing (2.8) we get
ϕ1(s−1, s1)− ϕ1(s−1, C1) =O ((s−1, s1), pelecs ) ∧D(pelecs )−O ((s−1, C1); pelecsC ) ∧D(pelecsC )
+
∑
j>1
(ϕj(s−1, C1)− ϕj(s−1, s1)) .
According to Definition 2.4, let us denote
E(ps) =
{
j ∈ {2, . . . , J} s.t. ∆−O(sj ; ps) > 0
}
.
We have
ϕ1(s−1, s1)− ϕ1(s−1, C1) =O ((s−1, s1); pelecs ) ∧D(pelecs )−O ((s−1, C1); pelecsC ) ∧D(pelecsC )
+
∑
j>1,j /∈E(ps)
(
ϕj(s−1, C1)−O(sj ; pelecs )
)
+
∑
j>1,j∈E(ps)
(ϕj(s−1, C1)− ϕj(s−1, s1))
≤O ((s−1, s1); pelecs ) ∧D(pelecs )−O ((s−1, C1); pelecsC ) ∧D(pelecsC )
+
∑
j>1,j /∈E(ps)
(O(sj ; pelecsC )−O(sj ; pelecs ))
+
∑
j>1,j∈E(ps)
(ϕj(s−1, C1)− ϕj(s−1, s1)).
Since pelecsC ≤ pelecs we get
ϕ1(s−1, s1)− ϕ1(s−1, C1) ≤
∑
j>1,j∈E(ps)
(ϕj(s−1, C1)− ϕj(s−1, s1)).
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But for any j ∈ E(ps), the quantity O(sj ; p−s ) ≤ ϕj(s−1, s1). As O(sj ; ·) is non-decreasing ans since we have
assumed psC < ps, we get
O(sj ; p−sC) ≤ O(sj ; p−s ) ≤ ϕj(s−1, s1).
For such j > 1 we thus have
ϕj(s−1, C1)− ϕj(s−1, s1) ≤ ϕj(s−1, C1)−O(sj ; pelecs
−
) ≤ ϕj(s−1, C1)−O(sj ; pelecsC ) ≤ 0,
from which it follows that ϕ1(s−1, s1)− ϕ1(s−1, C1) ≤ 0.
Now consider the case where ps = psC := p. Due to the market rule (2.6), we necessarily have pelecs = pelecsC :=
pelec.
• If O ((s−1, s1); pelec) ≤ O ((s−1, C1); pelec) ≤ D(pelec), then by the market clearing
ϕ1(s−1, s1) = O(s1; pelec) ≤ O(C1; pelec) = ϕ1(s−1, C1).
• If O ((s−1, s1); pelec) ≤ D(pelec) ≤ O ((s−1, C1); pelec), then
ϕ1(s−1, s1) = O(s1; pelec) ≤D(pelec)−
∑
j>1
ϕj(s−1, s1) = D(pelec)−
∑
j>1
O(sj ; pelec)
≤D(pelec)−
∑
j>1
ϕj(s−1, C1) = ϕ1(s−1, C1).
• If D(pelec) < O ((s−1, s1); pelec) ≤ O ((s−1, C1); pelec), by the market clearing we get
ϕ1(s−1, s1)− ϕ1(s−1, C1) =O ((s−1, s1), pelec) ∧D(pelec)−O ((s−1, C1); pelec) ∧D(pelec)
+
∑
j>1
(ϕj(s−1, C1)− ϕj(s−1, s1))
≤
∑
j>1
(ϕj(s−1, C1)− ϕj(s−1, s1))
≤
∑
j>1,j∈E(p)
(ϕj(s−1, C1)− ϕj(s−1, s1)).
From (2.7), we have for j ∈ E(p)
ϕj(s−1, s1) = O(sj , p−) + ∆−O(sj ; p) (D(p)−O ((s−1, s1), p
−))
∆−O ((s−1, s1), p)
and ϕj(s−1, C1) = O(sj ; p−) + ∆−O(sj ; p) (D(p)−O ((s−1, C1); p
−))
∆−O ((s−1, C1); p)
.
Hence, if E(p) is non empty then at least one producer exists, j 6= 1 such that ∆−O(sj ; p) > 0. and from the
desegregation of O and definition of ∆− it results that
ϕ1(s−1, s1)− ϕ1(s−1, C1)
=
∑
j>1,j∈E(p)
∆−O(sj , p)
(
(D(p)−O (s−1, p−)−O(C1; p−))
O ((s−1, C1); p)−O (s−1, p−)−O(C1; p−)
− (D(p)−O (s−1, p
−)−O(s1, p−))
O ((s−1, s1), p)−O (s−1, p−)−O(s1; p−)
)
.
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We note that
0 < O ((s−1, s1); p)−O (s−1, p−)−O(C1; p−)
< O ((s−1, C1); p)−O (s−1, p−)−O(C1; p−),
and that D(p)−O ((s−1, C1); p−) > 0 by definition of p. Then
ϕ1(s−1, s1)− ϕ1(s−1, C1)
≤
∑
j>1,j∈E(p)
∆−O(sj ; p)×
( (
D(p)−O (s−1, p−)−O(C1; p−)
)
O ((s−1, s1); p)−O (s−1, p−)−O(C1; p−)
−
(
D(p)−O (s−1, p−)−O(s1; p−)
)
O ((s−1, s1); p)−O (s−1, p−)−O(s1; p−)
)
.
Since D(p) ≤ O ((s−1, s1); p) and O(C1; p−) ≥ O(s1; p−), we can deduce that ϕ1(s−1, s1) − ϕ1(s−1, C1) ≤ 0.
This follows from the fact that when A ≤ B, the map x 7→ A− x
B − x is decreasing on [0, A).
B. We prove the uniqueness property (iii): all Nash equilibria induce the same electricity price and same quantities
of electricity bought to each producer.
First, we state the following consequence of the dominance property (i):
Lemma A.1. For any admissible strategy s = (s1, . . . , sJ), such that p(s) = p(C), if producer j is such that sj = Cj ,
then
ϕj(s) ≥ ϕj(C).
Proof. As arguments are very similar to the proof of (i), we just sketch them. Let s such that p(s) = p(C) := p.
Assume that Producer 1 is such that s1 = C1.
• If O (s; p) ≤ D(p), then by the market clearing
ϕ1(s) = O(s1; p) = O(C1; p) ≥ ϕ1(C).
• If D(p) < O (s; p) ≤ O (C; p), by the market clearing we get
ϕ1(s−1, C1) = O(C1; p−) + ∆−O(C1; p) (D(p)−O ((s−1;C1); p
−))
∆−O ((s−1;C1); p)
and ϕ1(C−1, C1) = O(C1; p−) + ∆−O(C1; p) (D(p)−O ((C−1;C1), p
−))
∆−O ((C−1;C1), p)
.
Thus,
ϕ1(s−1, C1)− ϕ1(C−1, C1)
= ∆−O(C1; p)
(
(D(p)−O ((s−1, C1); p−))
O ((s−1, C1); p)−O ((s−1, C1); p−)
− (D(p)−O ((C−1, C1); p
−))
O ((C−1, C1); p)−O ((C−1, C1); p−)
)
.
Assuming that ∆−O(C1; p) > 0, we note that
0 < O ((s−1, C1); p)−O ((s−1, C1); p−) ≤ O ((C−1, C1); p)−O ((s−1, C1); p−).
Since D(p)−O ((C−1, C1); p−) > 0 by definition of p,
ϕ1(s−1, C1)− ϕ1(C−1, C1)
≥ ∆−O(C1; p)
(
(D(p)−O ((s−1, C1); p−))
O ((C−1, C1); p)−O ((s−1, C1); p−)
− (D(p)−O ((C−1, C1); p
−))
O ((C−1, C1); p)−O ((C−1, C1); p−)
)
.
As O ((s−1, C1); p−) ≤ O ((C−1, C1); p−), we get ϕ1(s−1, C1)− ϕ1(C−1, C1) ≥ 0.
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We prove that the quantities are the same for all Nash equilibria. Let w an other Nash equilibrium that differs
from C. On the global offers we always have O (w; ·) ≤ O (C; ·) that implies p(w) ≥ p(C). Note that when
p(C) = plolc, all admissible strategies s are Nash as ϕj(C) = ϕj(s) = κj , for all j.
By the offers ordering, it is straightforward to show that
J∑
j=1
ϕj(w) ≤
J∑
j=1
ϕj(C).
Assume that the quantities are not the same, then there exists a producer, say Producer 1, such that ϕ1(w) < ϕ1(C).
And we also have
ϕ1(w) < ϕ1(C) ≤ O(C1; pelec(C)) ≤ O(C1; pelec(w−1, C1).
If p(C) = p(w−1, C1), then by Lemma A.1, we have that ϕ1(w−1, C1) ≥ ϕ1(C) and hence ϕ1(w−1, C1) >
ϕ1(w). In other words, w has a strictly favorable deviation for Producer 1 that contradicts the assumption that w is a
Nash equilibrium.
Now if p(C) < p(w−1, C1), by (2.9),
ϕ1(w) < ϕ1(C) ≤ O(C1; p(C)) ≤ O(C1; p((w−1, C1))−) ≤ ϕ1(w−1, C1),
and the same conclusion follows.
We prove that the equilibrium best bid price is unique: p¯(w) = p¯(C), for an other Nash equilibriumw. Assume
the contrary, p¯(w) > p¯(C). Then by the definition of p¯(·), we have that D(p(w)) < D(p(C)).
From (2.8) and (2.9),
J∑
j=1
ϕj(w) ≤ D(p(w)) < D(p(C)+) ≤ D(p(C)) ∧ O (C; p(C)) =
J∑
j=1
ϕj(C)
that contradicts the fact that Nash equilibria have same clearing quantities.
A.2 Proofs of Lemma 3.6 and Lemma 3.7
Proof of Lemma 3.6.
Although the result of this lemma is intuitive, the proof is rather technical. This is due to our assumptions, in particular
regarding demand, that allow the demand function to have discontinuity points and some non-elasticity areas (see
Assumption 2.1).
More precisely, if we define the map τ 7→ O (τ ; p) by
O (τ ; p) =
J∑
i=1
O(Cτj (·); p) =
J∑
i=1
κi1{p≥ci+τei} =
J∑
i=1
κi1{τ≤ p−ciei }
,
then we can observe that, for any p > 0 far enough from the ci, and any τ ′ ≥ τ ,
O (τ ′; p) ≤ O (τ ; p) and lim
→0+
O (τ + ; p) = O (τ ; p).
We call SD = {pd; lim→0+ D(pd + ) < D(pd)}, the set of discontinuity points of the Demand function.
We call Sκ = {pc;D(pc) =
∑
κi}, the set of prices that make demand coincide with some accumulation of
production capacities.
We observe that pelec(τ) ∈ {ci + τei, i = 1, . . . , j}∪SD ∪Sκ. In particular, from Definition 2.3, p(τ) = inf{p >
0;O (τ ; p) > D(p)}, and we obtain thatD(p(τ+)) ≤ O (τ+; p(τ+)) ≤ O (τ ; p(τ+)) from which we conclude
that p(τ + ) ≥ p(τ).
Now we prove the right continuity of τ 7→ p(τ). Let us fix a τ .
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(i) We first consider the case D(p(τ)) < O (τ ; p(τ)).
This means that p(τ) is of the form c` + τ`, for a given `. Then when  > 0 is small enough, we also have p(τ + ) =
c` + (τ + )e`. Indeed, D(c` + (τ + )e`) ≤ D(c` + τe`) and for a small enough ,
O (τ ; c` + τe`) = κ` +
∑
i 6=`
κi1{τ≤ c`−ci
1−ei/e`
} = O (τ + ; c` + (τ + )e`).
Thus, D(c` + (τ + )e`) < O (τ + ; c` + (τ + )e`) which implies that p(τ) + e` = c` + (τ + )e` ≥ p(τ + ) and
hence e` ≥ p(τ + )− p(τ).
(ii) We consider next the case D(p(τ)) > O (τ ; p(τ)).
This means that p(τ) ∈ SD is at a discontinuity point, say pd of the demand, p(τ) = pd. Then, for any δ > 0,
D(p(τ) + δ) < O (τ ; p(τ) + δ).
But
O (τ ; pd + δ) =
J∑
i=1
κi1{τ≤ pd+δ−ciei }
and we can choose δ to be small enough so that τ 6= pd+δ−ciei . Then, for a small enough ,
D(p(τ) + δ) < O (τ ; p(τ) + δ) = O (τ + ; p(τ) + δ),
which implies that p(τ) + δ ≥ p¯(τ + ), so we obtain δ ≥ p(τ + )− p(τ) ≥ 0.
(iii) We consider now the case D(p(τ)) = O (τ ; p(τ)).
This means that p(τ) ∈ Sκ, say p(τ) = pc Then, for any δ > 0,
D(p(τ) + δ) < O (τ ; p(τ) + δ).
But,
O (τ ; pc + δ) =
J∑
i=1
κi1{τ≤ pc+δ−ciei }
and we can choose δ small enough such that τ 6= pc+δ−ciei . Then, for  small enough,
D(p(τ) + δ) < O (τ ; p(τ) + δ) = O (τ + ; p(τ) + δ)
which implies that p(τ)+δ ≥ p(τ + ), so we get δ ≥ p(τ + )−p(τ) ≥ 0. The right-continuity of τ 7→ p¯(τ) follows,
by definition as p¯(τ) is a continuous transformation of p(τ).
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 3.7.
The proof consists in a complete analysis of the entire combination of situations, but each situation is elementary.
Let us suppose the opposite, that is there exists 0 ≤ t < t′ ≤ p such that the emission levels areW(t′) >W(t).
We define the function τ 7→ I(τ) valued in the subsets of {1, . . . , J} that lists the producers in the electricity
market producing at tax level τ :
i ∈ I(τ) if ϕi(τ) > 0.
In particular we have for all τ ∈ [0, p],
W(τ) =
∑
i∈I(τ)
eiϕi(τ).
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(i) We first examine the situation I(t′) = I(t).
To shorten the expressions, we adopt the following shortened notation
I(t) = I and I(t′) = I ′.
(i-a) If
∑
i∈I ϕi(t) = D(t) then, from the demand constraint (DC) and the emission levels hypothesis (EH), we
have
∑
i∈I
ϕi(t) = D(t) ≥ D(t′) ≥
∑
i∈I′
ϕi(t
′) (DC)
∑
i∈I
ϕi(t)ei <
∑
i∈I′
ϕi(t
′)ei. (EH)
We denote by Î the subset of I of index such that ci + tei = p(t). In particular, when j ∈ I \ Î , then ϕj(t) = κj .
Note that there exists at most one index (say `) in the set Î ∩ Î ′. If j ∈ Î \ Î ′ and k ∈ Î ′ \ Î , then, by the definition
of the sets
cj + ejt = c` + e`t, ck + ekt < cj + ejt,
cj + ejt
′ < c` + e`t′, ck + ekt′ = c` + e`t′,
cj + ejt
′ < ck + ekt, ck + ekt < c` + e`t,
from which, we easily deduce that
max{ej , j ∈ Î \ Î ′} < e` < min{ek, k ∈ Î ′ \ Î}. (A.4)
Now we decompose the sets I and I ′ in the demand constraint (DC) and the emission levels hypothesis (EH) as
follows: ∑
n∈I\Î∪Î′
κn + ϕ`(t) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′
ϕi(t) +
∑
k∈Î′\Î
κk ≥
∑
n∈I\Î∪Î′
κn + ϕ`(t
′) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′
κi +
∑
k∈Î′\Î
ϕk(t
′), (DC)
∑
n∈I\Î∪Î′
enκn + e`ϕ`(t) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′
eiϕi(t) +
∑
k∈Î′\Î
ekκk
<
∑
n∈I\Î∪Î′
enκn + e`ϕ`(t
′) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′
eiκi +
∑
k∈Î′\Î
ekϕk(t
′). (EH)
After simplification, we obtain
ϕ`(t) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′
ϕi(t) +
∑
k∈Î′\Î
κk ≥ ϕ`(t′) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′
κi +
∑
k∈Î′\Î
ϕk(t
′), (DC)
e`ϕ`(t) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′
eiϕi(t) +
∑
k∈Î′\Î
ekκk < e`ϕ`(t
′) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′
eiκi +
∑
k∈Î′\Î
ekϕk(t
′). (EH)
Assume first that ϕ`(t) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′ ϕi(t) ≥ ϕ`(t′) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′ κi. Equivalently, we have
ϕ`(t)− ϕ`(t′) ≥
∑
i∈Î\Î′
(κi − ϕi(t))
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and from (A.4),
e` (ϕ`(t)− ϕ`(t′)) ≥
∑
i∈Î\Î′
ei(κi − ϕi(t)).
By combining the above with the emission levels hypothesis (EH), we obtain the following contradiction:
∑
k∈Î′\Î ekκk <∑
k∈Î′\Î ekϕk(t
′).
Assume now that ϕ`(t) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′ ϕi(t) < ϕ`(t
′) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′ κi. Multiplying the demand constraint (DC) by
eˆ := min{ek, k ∈ Î ′ \ Î}, we get∑
k∈Î′\Î
ek(κk − ϕk(t′)) ≥ eˆ (ϕ`(t)− ϕ`(t′)) + eˆ
∑
i∈Î\Î′
(κi − ϕi(t)).
But from (EH) and (A.4), we also have∑
k∈Î′\Î
ek(κk − ϕk(t′)) < e` (ϕ`(t)− ϕ`(t′)) + e`
∑
i∈Î\Î′
(κi − ϕi(t)),
then
0 ≥ (eˆ− e`) (ϕ`(t)− ϕ`(t′)) + (eˆ− e`)
∑
i∈Î\Î′
(κi − ϕi(t)),
which contradicts our assumption.
(i-b) If
∑
i∈I
ϕi(t) < D(t) then, for all i ∈ I , ϕi(t) = κi and (EH) is necessarily false.
(ii) We examine the situation I(t′) 6= I(t)
We add the following shortened notation: I(t) ∩ I ′(t) = II ′.
We break down I and I ′ into the sets II ′, I\I ′ and I ′\I . We denote by Î the set of index i ∈ I such that ci+tei = p(t).
In particular, when j ∈ I\Î , then ϕj(t) = κj .
We first derive some generic relations between the emission rates for these.
Among the indexes in the set II ′, we observe that at most one index exists (say `) in the set Î ∩ Î ′. If j ∈ Î\Î ′, if
k ∈ Î ′\Î , then, by the definition of the sets
cj + ejt = c` + e`t, ck + ekt < cj + ejt,
cj + ejt
′ < c` + e`t′, ck + ekt′ = c` + e`t′,
cj + ejt
′ < ck + ekt, ck + ekt < c` + e`t,
from which, we easily deduce that
eˆ := max
{
ej , j ∈ II ′ ∩
(
Î\Î ′
)}
< e` < min
{
ek, k ∈ II ′ ∩
(
Î ′\Î
)}
:= eˆ′. (A.9)
For j ∈ I\I ′ and k ∈ I ′\I , we have
cj + ejt < ck + ekt and cj + ejt′ > ck + ekt′
from which, we also easily deduce that
max{ek, k ∈ I ′\I} < min{ej , j ∈ I\I ′}. (A.10)
For the same j and k, for (cˆ, eˆ) representative of index in II ′ ∩ Î \ Î ′, and (cˆ′, eˆ′) representative of index in II ′ ∩ Î ′ \ Î ,
we also have
cj + ejt ≤ cˆ+ eˆt
cj + ejt
′ > cˆ+ eˆt′ and
ck + ekt > cˆ
′ + eˆ′t
ck + ekt
′ ≤ cˆ′ + eˆ′t′
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from which, we deduce that
min{ej , j ∈ I\I ′} > (e`, eˆ) ∨max{ek, k ∈ I ′\I}
max{ek, k ∈ I ′\I} < (e`, eˆ′) ∧min{ej , j ∈ I\I ′}.
(A.11)
We divide the analysis in cases. In the first one the demand is fully satisfied for the price pelec(t).
(ii-a) If
∑
i∈I ϕI(t) = D(p
elec(t)),
∑
i∈I\I′
ϕI +
∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t) = D(p
elec(t)) ≥ D(pelec(t′)) ≥
∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t
′) +
∑
i∈I′\I
ϕi(t
′), (DC)
∑
i∈I\I′
ϕi(t)ei +
∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t)ei <
∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t
′)ei +
∑
i∈I′\I
ϕi(t)ei. (EH)
We must then examine the following two subcases, relative to the situations where the demand is satisfied or not at
the price pelec(t′).
(ii-a-1) If
∑
i∈I′ ϕi(t
′) < D(pelec(t′)), then ϕi(t′) = κi for all i ∈ I ′ and∑
j∈I\I′
ϕj(t) +
∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t) >
∑
i∈ II ′
κi +
∑
k∈I′\I
κk, (DC)
∑
j∈I\I′
ϕj(t)ej +
∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t)ei <
∑
i∈ II ′
κiei +
∑
k∈I′\I
κkek. (EH)
As ϕi(t) = κi when i ∈ (I\Î) ∩ II ′, we can simplify the two sides of (DC) and (EH) by the sum over (I\Î) ∩ II ′.
The remaining part of II ′ is {`} ∪
(
Î\Î ′ ∩ II ′
)
:∑
j∈I\I′
ϕj(t) + ϕ` +
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
ϕi(t) > κ` +
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
κi +
∑
k∈I′\I
κk, (DC)
∑
j∈I\I′
ejϕj(t) + e`ϕ` +
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
eiϕi(t) < e`κ` +
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
eiκi +
∑
k∈I′\I
ekκk. (EH)
Then we multiply (DC) by e¯ := (e`, eˆ) ∨max{ek, k ∈ I ′\I}, and we obtain by (A.11)∑
j∈I\I′
ejϕj(t) + e¯ϕ` + e¯
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
ϕi(t) > e¯κ` + e¯
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
κi +
∑
k∈I′\I
ekκk.
We subtract with (EH) :
(e¯− e`)ϕ` +
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
(e¯− ei)ϕi(t) > (e¯− e`)κ` +
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
(e¯− ei)κi.
But e¯ ≥ e` when ` exists, and e¯ ≥ eˆ ≥ ei for i ∈ Î\Î ′ ∩ II ′. So we obtain our contradiction.
(ii-a-2) If
∑
i∈I′ ϕi(t
′) = D(pelec(t′)), then∑
j∈I\I′
ϕj(t) +
∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t) >
∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t
′) +
∑
k∈I′\I
ϕk(t
′), (DC)
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∑
j∈I\I′
ϕj(t)ej +
∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t)ei <
∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t
′)ei +
∑
k∈I′\I
ϕk(t
′)ek. (EH)
We decompose I\I ′ =
(
I\(I ′ ∪ Î)
)
∪ Î\I ′ and I ′\I =
(
I ′\(I ∪ Î ′)
)
∪ Î ′\I:∑
j∈I\(I′∪Î)
κj +
∑
j∈Î\I′
ϕj(t) +
∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t) >
∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t
′) +
∑
k∈Î′\I
ϕk(t
′) +
∑
k∈I′\(I∪Î′)
κk, (DC)
∑
j∈I\(I′∪Î)
ejκj +
∑
j∈Î\I′
ejϕj(t) +
∑
i∈ II ′
eiϕi(t) <
∑
i∈ II ′
eiϕi(t
′) +
∑
k∈Î′\I
ekϕk(t
′) +
∑
k∈I′\(I∪Î′)
ekκk. (EH)
We also break down the set II ′ = (I ∩ I ′):
II ′ = ( II ′ ∩ {`}) ∪
(
II ′ ∩ Î\Î ′
)
∪
(
II ′ ∩ Î ′\Î
)
∪
(
I\Î ∩ I ′\Î ′)
)
.
∑
j∈I\(I′∪Î))
κj +
∑
j∈Î\I′
ϕj(t) + ϕ`(t) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
ϕi(t) +
∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
ϕi(t)
> ϕ`(t
′) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
ϕi(t
′) +
∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
ϕi(t
′) +
∑
k∈Î′\I
ϕk(t
′) +
∑
k∈I′\(I∪Î′)
κk, (DC)
∑
j∈I\(I′∪Î)
ejκj +
∑
j∈Î\I′
ejϕj(t) + e`ϕ`(t) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
eiϕi(t) +
∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
eiϕi(t)
< e`ϕ`(t
′) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
eiϕi(t
′) +
∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
eiϕi(t
′) +
∑
k∈Î′\I
ekϕk(t
′) +
∑
k∈I′\(I∪Î′)
ekκk. (EH)
For index i in the last subset (I\Î ∩ I ′\Î ′), we have ϕi(t) = κi and ϕi(t′) = κi, so we simplify (DC) and (EH) from
this last subset. Thus,∑
j∈I\(I′∪Î)
κj +
∑
j∈Î\I′
ϕj(t) + ϕ`(t) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
ϕi(t) +
∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
κi
> ϕ`(t
′) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
κi +
∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
ϕi(t
′) +
∑
k∈Î′\I
ϕk(t
′) +
∑
k∈I′\(I∪Î′)
κk, (DC)
∑
j∈I\(I′∪Î)
ejκj +
∑
j∈Î\I′
ejϕj(t) + e`ϕ`(t) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
eiϕi(t) +
∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
eiκi
< e`ϕ`(t
′) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
eiκi +
∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
eiϕi(t
′) +
∑
k∈Î′\I
ekϕk(t
′) +
∑
k∈I′\(I∪Î′
ekκk. (EH)
We multiply (DC) by e¯ := (e`, eˆ) ∨max{ek, k ∈ I ′\I} , we get by (A.11)∑
j∈I\(I′∪Î)
ejκj +
∑
j∈Î\I′
ejϕj(t) + e¯ϕ`(t) + e¯
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
ϕi(t) + e¯
∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
κi
> e¯ϕ`(t
′) + e¯
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
κi + e¯
∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
ϕi(t
′) +
∑
k∈Î′\I
ekϕk(t
′) +
∑
k∈I′\(I∪Î′
ekκk.
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We subtract (EH)
(e¯− e`)ϕ`(t) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
(e¯− ei)ϕi(t) +
∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
(e¯− ei)κi
> (e¯− e`)ϕ`(t′) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
(e¯− ei)κi +
∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
(e¯− ei)ϕi(t′).
We arrange the terms
(e¯− e`)ϕ`(t) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
(e¯− ei)ϕi(t) +
∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
(e¯− ei)κi
> (e¯− e`)ϕ`(t′) +
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
(e¯− ei)κi +
∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
(e¯− ei)ϕi(t′).
If ` exists, then e¯ = e` and ∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
(e` − ei) (κi − ϕi(t′)) >
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
(e` − ei) (κi − ϕi(t)) ,
∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
(e` − eˆ′) (κi − ϕi(t′)) >
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
(e` − eˆ) (κi − ϕi(t)) .
(A.26)
But eˆ < e` < eˆ′, and the contradiction follows.
If ` does not exist, then e¯ = eˆ ∨max{ek, k ∈ I ′\I}∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
(e¯− ei) (κi − ϕi(t′)) >
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
(e¯− ei) (κi − ϕi(t)) ,
∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
(e¯− eˆ′) (κi − ϕi(t′)) >
∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
(e¯− eˆ) (κi − ϕi(t)) .
(A.27)
But max{ek, k ∈ I ′\I} < eˆ′, and the contradiction follows.
(ii-b) If
∑
i∈I ϕi(t) < D(p
elec(t)) then for all i ∈ I , ϕi(t) = κi.
(ii-b 1) If
∑
i∈I′ ϕi(t
′) < D(pelec(t′)), then ϕi(t′) = κi for all i ∈ I ′. Moreover, we have that O (t, p(t)) ≥
D(p(t)) + ε) ≥ D(p(t′)) > O (t′, p(t′)) and (DC)-(EH) becomes∑
j∈I\I′
κj >
∑
k∈I′\I
κk, (DC)
∑
j∈I\I′
ejκj <
∑
k∈I′\I
ekκk. (EH)
Then, we multiply (DC) by min{ej ; j ∈ I\I ′} ≥ max{ek; k ∈ I ′\I}, and we obtain a contradiction with (EH).
(ii-b-2) If
∑
i∈I′ ϕi(t
′) = D(pelec(t′)), we go back to the analysis of the case (ii-a-2), with the main difference that
all quantities ϕi(t) are now equal to κi. We go to inequalities (A.26) and (A.27) which are simplified as the right-had
sides are now zero. The contradiction follows with the same arguments.
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